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Abstract: We argue that EVENT is a basic concept that humanists, social scientists and 
cognitive psychologists can use to build a consilient research platform for the study of 
experiences that people deem religious. Grounding the study of experience in event 
cognition allows us to reframe several classic problems in the study of “religious 
experience”: (1) the function of culture-specific knowledge in the production of 
experiences, (2) the relationship between original experiences and later narratives, and 
(3) the relationship between experiences and appraisal processes. At the same time, 
construing experiences as events allows us to integrate disparate lines of research in CSR 
to create an integrated framework for studying both existing and emergent phenomena.   
 
Key words: Event cognition; predictive coding; (religious) experiences; building block 
approach; complex cultural concepts (CCCs); appraisals. 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
Research for this article was supported by the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial 
Foundation (Ann Taves) and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (Egil 
Asprem). The authors wish to thank Ray Paloutzian, Michael Barlev and two anonymous 
reviewers for valuable comments on earlier drafts, and our colleagues in the Department 
of Religious Studies and especially the Religion, Experience, and Mind Lab at UCSB for 
helpful discussions. 
 
 
 
	   1 
Experience as Event:  
Event Cognition and the Study of (Religious) Experience 
 
1. Introduction: Basic concepts for the study of experience 
The cognitive science of religion (CSR) has created a platform that allows humanists, 
social scientists, and cognitive scientists to propose more refined and complex 
approaches to the study of religion. In doing so, it has had to translate some of the 
categories of religious studies into terminology that (1) can be operationalized with 
greater specificity in experimental work and (2) links up with existing bodies of research 
in the cognitive and behavioral sciences. The most important basic concept that CSR 
researchers have operationalized so far is that of REPRESENTATION. Drawing primarily on 
evolutionary cognitive psychology (Sperber, 1996; Boyer, 2001; Atran, 2002; cf. Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992), research focused on the cognitive processes that constrain how 
religious representations are shaped, remembered, and spread has revolutionized the 
study of religious beliefs (e.g. Boyer, 2001; Barrett, 2004; Slone, 2004; McCauley, 
2011). Together with ACTION, it has also been central to cognitive theorizing in the study 
of ritual and practice (e.g. Lawson & McCauley, 1990; McCauley & Lawson, 2002; 
Whitehouse, 2004; Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Sørensen, 2007; Nielbo & Sørensen, 2013; 
Schjoedt et al., 2013).  
Religious experience, long a core aspect of the study of religion, has received 
considerably less attention.  This has been due in part to a desire to stress ordinary and 
commonplace experiences rather than the unusual experiences that were of interest to 
William James and his heirs (McCauley and Cohen, 2010; Barrett, 2011), but also to the 
absence of a consistent basic-concept vocabulary that facilitates the integration of 
experience into other lines of research. The difficulties inherent in the use of first-person 
narratives, which traditionally provided most of our data, present further challenges.  
In downplaying unusual experiences, CSR has not been able to investigate the 
kind of events – dreams, visions, voices, and appearances -- to which established 
representations and rituals are typically linked.  As long as these originatory events are 
presupposed, but not investigated, we will know little about the cognitive processes 
involved in the emergence of new social formations and their attendant representations 
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and practices. We believe that time is ripe for CSR to incorporate experience in both its 
commonplace and unusual forms into its conceptual framework.  In what follows, we 
argue that experiences are events and that research on event cognition not only allows us 
to reframe several classic problems in the study of “religious experience,” but also to 
integrate the study of experience into frameworks for studying both existing and 
emergent representations, rituals, and social formations.  Before moving on to these 
issues, however, we need to indicate why a more refined vocabulary for the study of 
experience is necessary.  
The metatheoretical backdrop to our argument is a building block approach 
(BBA) that distinguishes between “complex cultural concepts” (CCCs), such as 
RELIGION, MAGIC, and MYSTICISM, and “basic concepts” (BCs), such as 
REPRESENTATION, ACTION, and EVENT (for earlier articulations see Taves 2009, 2013a, 
2015; Asprem in press).1 While we define CCCs as abstract nouns with unstable, 
overlapping, culturally determined meanings that vary within and across cultures and 
social formations, we assume that BCs are relatively simple and stable concepts (Sperber 
1996, 67-70, 89). Unlike the CCCs that they enable, BCs are translatable across cultures 
because they are grounded in evolved mental architecture and embodied interactions with 
the environment.  
The research process of the BBA is, first, to disassemble, fractionate, or reverse 
engineer2 CCCs into more basic components (or “building blocks”), in order to see how 
they have been constructed from and supported by specific configurations of lower-level 
processes (Fig. 1). This means that the CCCs become our explananda, while basic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an overview of methods and terminology for the building block approach, see our website at: 
<INSERT>. 
2 Some anthropologists have used the term “fractionating” to identify “cognitively and behaviorally 
universal patterns” that are associated with a “folk category” such as “ritual” or “religion” or what we 
prefer to call CCCs (Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014: 675; Boyer and Bergstrom 2008: 119). Although we 
have no objection to the term “fractionating,” we are not just searching for universals. We prefer “reverse 
engineering” because it is a term that is widely used for the process of taking apart something complicated 
in order to see how it was put together and, thus, envisions the reassembly side of the BBA. Essentially, 
though, reverse engineering is simply a form of analytic method (of the “decompositional” type that has 
been crucial to science and natural philosophy since the early modern period; see Beaney, 2015).  
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concepts, such as ACTION, REPRESENTATION, and EVENT, serve as explanantia at the 
behavioral level of analysis and provide consilient links to lower levels.3  As explananda, 
CCCs should not be operationalized by scholars, but rather be taken as data.  The point of 
the BBA, thus, is not simply to reduce CCCs to more basic components, but to reduce in 
order to understand how people individually or in groups have assembled them into 
various formations.  
 
[FIG 1 GOES HERE] 
[Caption: Fig. 1: Fig. 1. The BBA research process at behavioral level: disassembling CCCs 
into basic concepts, and using them to trace alternative pathways and set up comparisons across 
socio-cultural formations.] 
 
Considered as a phrase, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE is a CCC that is easily 
disassembled into EXPERIENCES (a more basic concept) that people consider RELIGIOUS or MYSTICAL or PARANORMAL (all CCCS). Because these CCCs take on a plethora of 
meanings in different theological, scholarly, and popular contexts with boundaries 
between meanings that are often blurred in practice, classifying different experiential 
accounts as “religious”, “mystical”, “paranormal”, or “supernatural” is not very helpful. 
The job of the scholar is to explain how experiences come to be generated, interpreted, 
explained and classified in specific ways in specific social formations, and to do so as far 
as possible with recourse to basic concepts. This is where we find event cognition to be a 
promising framework: it gives us relevant basic concepts for studying experience that 
work across different disciplines as well as different cultures; it links downward into a 
broader cognitive science literature; and it helps us refine existing research questions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Breaking down the doctrinal and ritualistic aspects of religion into basic elements of “representation” and 
“action” has a history that goes back to Durkheim, who wrote in The Elementary Forms: “Religious [and 
other] phenomena fall into two basic categories: beliefs and rites.  The first are states of opinion and consist 
of representations; the second are particular modes of action” (Durkheim, 1995: 34). To these two 
“elementary forms,” we are adding events. Durkheim’s methodology of seeking elementary forms is a 
precursor of the building block approach (he even used the term “building block”).  We are not assuming, 
however, that the elements “have the same objective significance and fulfill the same function everywhere” 
[Durkheim, 1995: 4]).  Moreover, while these elements may be viewed as “primitives” at the level of 
behavior, they are further reduced at lower levels of analysis. 
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develop new methods, and formulate new hypotheses. We will discuss each of these 
aspects in separate parts, starting with a brief introduction to event cognition and a 
discussion of how we can use it to restructure the study of experience. 
 
2. Event Cognition 
2.1 Inferring what’s happening: Basic principles of event cognition 
The event cognition literature integrates a broad body of research covering perception, 
reading comprehension, attention, memory, and problem solving (see Radvansky & 
Zacks, 2014). Following Zacks and Tversky (2001), an “event” can be defined simply as 
“a segment of time at a given location that is perceived by an observer to have a 
beginning and an end”. “Event cognition”, then, refers to a set of mechanisms that allow 
us not only to form mental representations of what is going on around us and segment it 
into discrete, bounded events, but also to identify and store knowledge about specific 
types of events, predict what will happen next, and use these models to regulate action – 
from basic motor control to complex intentional action sequences (Radvansky and Zacks, 
2014).  
 Central to this is the notion of an event model, a mental representation of the 
relevant information that comprises a given event. It will typically represent relevant 
entities and agents, the relations between them, and the place and time in which the event 
takes place, mapped from the point of view of the subject. Besides understanding what is 
going on around us, we also use event models to forecast future events, imagine 
hypothetical events, understand events that are narrated to us, and reconstruct memories 
of past events.  
Event models are related to memory in complex ways. The working model of 
what is going on right now is actively maintained in working memory. It can however be 
stored as an episodic memory, which can be recreated later as a new mental model in the 
context of a new event of “remembering what happened”.  Furthermore, generic 
information about types of events is stored in semantic memory, which, together with 
non-declarative, procedural memory for motor tasks, forms a crucial part of event 
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schemata. This schematic information is, in turn, used actively to identify events and to 
make real-time predictions in event cognition.4  
All three forms of memory -- episodic, semantic and procedural – are actively 
engaged in event processing and, hence, play a significant role in guiding both perception 
and action. These broad connections between memory, perception, and action are 
supported by recent studies in the neuroanatomical and functional characteristics of 
memory (see review in Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012), which suggest that the two large-
scale cortical networks responsible for semantic familiarity on the one hand (the anterior 
temporal system) and episodic recollection on the other (the posterior medial system) 
both contribute to cognitive functions beyond the scope of memory as traditionally 
conceived, particularly to allow “memory-guided behavior” through the construction of 
event models.  
The event cognition system should be understood in the context of a hierarchical 
predictive coding (HPC) framework, which conceives of the brain as a Bayesian 
inference engine that tries to explain the causes of its inputs as a means of predicting 
what will happen next (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston 2008; Friston, 2009; Bar, 2009; 
Huang & Rao, 2011; Clark, 2013). The framework is hierarchical in the sense that it 
generates inference-driven predictions relative to a series of nested levels of sensation, 
perception, and action. As Hohwy, Roepstorff and Friston summarize: 
 
The cognitive system is ordered hierarchically in levels. For any pair of levels, the higher level 
will have hypotheses that predict the driving bottom–up error signal from the lower level. The 
higher level will itself provide error signals for a yet higher level. The lower level of the pair will 
be higher level for a yet lower level. (Hohwy, Roepstorff & Friston, 2008) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Radvansky and Zacks define an event schema simply as “a representation of knowledge about how a type 
of event typically unfolds” (2014, 7). While they connect schemata with abstract knowledge stored in 
semantic memory, we take a broader view. First, since we take “knowledge” to include not only learned 
representations, but also the evolved core knowledge systems studied by evolutionary psychologists, we 
hold that event schemata are never completely cultural, but constrained by evolved learning systems. 
Second, since we think event schemata are crucial not only for parsing events that people observe from the 
outside, but, more importantly, for events in which they themselves participate, procedural memory for the 
performance of tasks is another crucial component of event schemata and their acquisition 
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The process of matching up top-down predictions with bottom-up signals (error 
monitoring) can also be construed as a process of evaluating or appraising the overall 
significance of the stimulus event for the organism (Scherer 2001, 369-71).5  An error 
signal, thus, indicates a failed appraisal at a given level, and is pushed upward in the 
processing hierarchy.6 When error signals multiply, predictions will be updated and new 
inferences will be drawn. These predictive hypotheses are essentially “prior probabilities” 
for what will happen next, developed and constantly updated in a dynamic interplay 
between bottom-up information and top-down predictions.  
It is important to keep in mind that predictive coding is an unconscious process in 
which “predictions” and “errors” are coded at levels below the threshold of conscious 
awareness – not a falsificationist testing of reflectively held hypotheses. Although it is 
not yet clear how far up the cognitive hierarchy predictive coding holds beyond sensory 
encoding and perception, event cognition takes place at the level just above perception 
and is thus still fairly basic. Percepts are the brain’s current best hypothesis for the 
driving sensory input; on the next level, competing event models – influenced by learned 
and evolved schemata – try to explain the interactions between the percepts that the brain 
has inferred at time t. The model that best explains the scene becomes the working model 
at t. As lower-level hypotheses about objects and entities in the perceptual field are 
revised (e.g., due to changes in the driving stimulus) and the scene changes at t’, event-
related prediction error propagates upwards in the system, eventually causing the working 
model at t’ to be updated or replaced (thus, a “driving on the freeway” event can 
gradually change into a “parking the car” event due to a feedback between top-down 
predictions and bottom-up sensory stimuli).  Researchers need to take the complex 
interactions between bottom-up expectations and top-down input into account at multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Following the lead of Scherer (2001, 371) and other emotion researchers (for a recent overview, see 
Moors et al. 2013), we are using the term “appraisal” as “a general, albeit fuzzy, concept to describe the 
way organisms assign significance to external and internal events in order to prepare adaptive responses to 
deal with their consequences.” It thus includes both automatic, unconscious and deliberate, reflective 
processes of evaluation that take place at different levels of processing and potentially imply very different 
mechanisms.   
6 On our view, error monitoring is in fact the most basic appraisal process, and hence the one that higher-
order appraisals are built upon. See also footnote 11 below. 
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levels when attempting to explain how and why people understand their experiences the 
way they do.  
 
[FIG. 2 GOES HERE] 
[Caption: Fig. 2. Event Cognition as Hierarchical Predictive System. Event 
models receive information from event schemata (prior knowledge) and from prediction error 
signals that are created by the model’s active predictions tested against input flowing from the 
body and the senses. Error monitoring is an appraisal process. Increased error signal (i.e., partial 
or complete appraisal failure) causes the current model to be revised or replaced by a new model 
that explains away the bottom-up signals. Based on Kurby & Zacks, 2008.] 
 
This Bayesian perspective on how the cognitive system explains its environment 
provides us with a clearer view of the different components of event cognition. The 
working model is privileged above other event models because it predicts the current 
upstream information. Event segmentation is explained with reference to sudden 
increases in prediction error brought forward from the lower levels when old predictions 
no longer explain the driving sensory stream (Zacks et al., 2007). That is, event 
boundaries are traces of where the working model was updated or replaced, due, for 
example, to the perceiving subject entering or exiting a room, reacting to a new entity or 
agent, or starting or finishing an action sequence. Furthermore, we can understand event 
schemata as providing Bayesian prior probabilities that guide top-down predictions. As a 
result, prior probabilities, which are generated by our evolved minds interacting with our 
socio-cultural and natural environment, will influence how new events are segmented and 
processed in the future. Put in humanist terms, this is how “culture” – in the sense of 
culture-specific knowledge or patterned practice (Roepstorff et al. 2010) -- shapes our 
experience. 
 
2.2 Experiences as Events 
The language of event cognition allows us to be much more precise in the way we talk 
about experience.  First, it allows us to specify the distinction between “experience” in 
the abstract and “experiences” in the plural. The former refers to the flow of information 
in so far as we are aware of it, whereas the latter refers to discrete events that have been 
segmented out of the flow of experience such that each experience is perceived to have a 
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beginning and an end.7 Phenomenologically, what we refer to colloquially as 
“experiences” are simply personally experienced events that are particularly salient. 
Theoretically, they are associated with spikes in prediction error causing updates in the 
working model. We can think of these as “experience events” to remind ourselves that 
experiences are events.   
 Second, borrowing from social psychology we can distinguish between intended 
and unintended events (Malle, 2004).  Intended events, whether initiated by ourselves or 
others, are ACTIONS (cf. Anscombe, 1959). At the level of folk psychology (Malle, 2005), 
people assume that actors have intentions and, thus, can give reasons as explanations for 
their actions. Unintended events just happen. We offer causes -- not reasons – as 
explanations for unintended events. Moreover both intended and unintended events may 
contain a mix of intended and unintended subevents, or segments.  Thus, a “driving the 
car on a long trip” event might include an unintended “falling asleep at the wheel” 
subevent.  Conversely, a dream – an unintended event – may contain many seemingly 
intended action subevents.  
 Third, the event cognition literature allows us to locate experience events along a 
continuum based on the proportion of information derived from external and internal 
sources. Although the event cognition literature has focused primarily on the parsing and 
processing of information flowing from the external environment through the sensory 
apparatus, the predictive activity of working models is not targeted directly on “the 
world” but rather on the groups of neurons that carry upstream information from further 
down the hierarchy (cf. Friston, 2005a). This means that strokes, drugs, electrical shock 
and other direct modulations of neural activity can produce “noise” that the event system 
will try to explain away, even in the absence of any “outside” stimulus propagating 
through the sensory system (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Friston, 2005).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Note that we are talking about “phenomenal experience” (e.g., “of something”) as opposed to 
“accumulated experience” (as in “being experienced”) – which is, roughly, the distinction that German 
captures with its two separate terms for experience, “Erlebnis” and “Erfahrung”. Having an “Erlebnis,” 
then, is to have an active working model (e.g., “I am currently typing on the keyboard”), while accumulated 
“Erfahrung” in a certain domain (e.g., being an experienced writer) is to possess well-developed event 
schemata for the activity in question. See also our discussion of skill in section 4.2. 
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 Internal events include not only such anomalous neural phenomena, however, but 
also common events like dreams, internal dialogues, fantasies and daydreams, thoughts, 
and internal voices. People may experience these internal events as either intended (e.g., 
an internal monologue) or involuntary (a nightmare). This gives us a typology of four 
different event types (Table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 GOES HERE]  [Caption:	  Table	  1:	  Event	  types	  (adapted	  from	  Malle	  2004,	  76)]	  	  
We can use dreams to highlight certain important features of event models.  First, 
they illustrate that even the most internally generated event can draw upon stored 
information about past external events.  Thus, neural activation during REM sleep may 
trigger episodic memories, activating stored event models and generating a new working 
model of what is happening now, which draws in turn on semantic knowledge about 
specific types of events. Second, it is important to distinguish between event models as 
mental models and the event narratives that are based on them. The former are mental 
representations, while the latter are externalized public representations (Sperber, 1996: 
24-28, 61-66; cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1997).8 So, for example, we generate (mental) event 
models when we dream, but we do not generate an event narrative – a public 
representation based on a remembered event model – until we attempt to recount the 
dream or write it down in a diary. When someone reads the diary or listens to an oral 
recounting of the dream, they grasp its content by forming a new mental event model to 
simulate what is being told.  Based on Radvansky and Zacks’s conclusion that the same 
basic principles for recognizing, processing, memorizing and retrieving events are at 
work when we create models of what is happening right now (the working model) and 
when we comprehend events that are narrated or presented to us orally, in text, or on the 
screen (“situation models”; cf. van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), we infer that they are also at 
work when we actively narrate events, whether from memory, imagination, or what we 
observe.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Sperber (1996: 61) distinguishes between ”representations internal to the information-processing device – 
mental representation; and … representations external to the device and which the device can process as 
inputs – that is, public representation.” 
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3. Reframing classic problems in the study of (religious) experience 
Viewing experiences as events allows us to reframe several classic problems in the study 
of experiences that people deem “religious”. In this section we show how research on 
event cognition can help us illuminate three key problem areas: 
 
1. The function of culture-specific knowledge in the production of experiences. 
2. The relation between “original” experiences and later narratives. 
3. The relationship between experiences and appraisals. 
 
3.1. The function of culture-specific knowledge 
The literature on religious experiences has long been divided between “perennialists” and 
“constructivists” (Table 2). This divide concerns the role of culture-specific knowledge in 
shaping experiences.9 Perennialists have traditionally held to the idea of a “core 
experience” that is superficially differentiated into variant depictions and interpretations 
as it is “filtered” through different cultural matrixes. By contrast, constructivists have 
argued that experiential accounts are wholly determined by cultural expectations: there is 
no raw experience, only appraisals all the way down. Constructionists have also been 
suspicious of experience on epistemological grounds. Even if there were actual 
experiences behind public experience narratives, there would be no way for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the following paragraphs, we are assuming that the key aspect of “culture” at stake in the 
perennialist/constructionist discussion is the ability of culturally-specific schemata to structure human 
experience, the extent to which it happens, and the methodological implications of this for researching 
public representations of experiences (mental event models). However, since we follow Tooby & 
Cosmides’s (1992, 119) definition of culture as “any mental, behavioral, or material commonalities shared 
across individuals, from those that are shared across the entire species down to the limiting case of those 
shared only by a dyad, regardless of why these commonalities exist,” we are not assuming that all schemata 
belong to a specific culture. Some, such as learning how to walk or how to breast-feed a baby, are what 
Tooby & Cosmides would call metacultural schemata, built on maturationally natural dispositions that 
require little overt teaching, and are found with little variation across the world (cf. McCauley, 2011). Put 
differently, some schemata are acquired very easily through evolved learning systems, while others depend 
to a much larger degree on contingent cultural knowledge and patterned practice (Roepstorff et al., 2010). 
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(humanist) scholar to access them. It therefore seemed safer to stay with what could be 
empirically observed, namely the narratives and their institutional contexts.  
 
[TABLE 2 GOES HERE] 
 
While the essentialist notion of a stable core experience underlying the great 
disparity of “religious experiences” is unconvincing, the constructivist focus on discourse 
alone is also unsatisfactory. An event cognition framework allows us to view culture-
specific knowledge as a subset of prior knowledge. Experiences, then, result from the 
interaction between input – in the form of perceptual and sensory cues – and prior 
knowledge.  Thus, while we agree with the constructivists that experience is appraised – 
in the predictive coding sense -- all the way down, event cognition suggests we can know 
a lot more about the underlying sensory cues that are involved in what we call “real-time 
appraisals.” 
The distinction we are making between cues and prior knowledge was explicit in 
the earlier attributional theories embraced by constructivists (Proudfoot and Shaver, 
1975; Proudfoot, 1985; Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick, 1985). However, they typically 
de-emphasized the cues relative to post-hoc appraisals and paid little attention to the real-
time interaction between cues and tacit appraisals during experience events.  The event 
cognition framework allows us to model those interactions between input cues and prior 
knowledge in all their variety much more precisely. 
Conceiving of culture-specific knowledge as a subset of prior knowledge also 
allows us to recognize the interplay between culturally based and evolved prior 
knowledge in the construction of event models. Thus, not only are the processes of event 
segmentation and event model formation (which determine how we form, structure, store, 
and retrieve events) universally human, but our expectations with respect to events also 
rely heavily on evolved “core knowledge” systems (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007).  These are, essentially, evolved learning systems that allow us to acquire 
certain schemata with great ease. For example, very limited sensory cues are needed to 
identify biological systems in motion. Thus, when motion-information compatible with 
biological systems is detected, it will automatically trigger predictions of intentional 
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behavior (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014: 98-101). When perceiving humans, there are 
programs for moving from subtle behavioral cues (facial expressions, eye movement, 
posture, voice modulation) to inferences about specific mental states and action 
dispositions. All of this contributes to how we segment the event, what we pay attention 
to, and what we predict will happen next. 
Knowledge that is truly culture-specific does, however, also play an important 
part in event processing. Such knowledge comes in two types: knowledge about event 
types (schemata), and knowledge about specific entities (e.g. objects, agents, places) – 
what Radvansky and Zacks (2014: 27-28) call referent-specific knowledge. For example, 
knowing that deceased people might manifest as ghosts in specific ways (e.g. as 
footsteps, sudden fluctuations in temperature, flash of blurry images) and at specific 
places (e.g., an attic, the cemetery) makes it possible to interpret ambiguous incoming 
sensory information (whether visual, auditory, tactile or olfactory) as confirming an 
apparition of a ghost. If the predictions generated by such a ghost-seeing schema 
successfully explain those inputs, the subject experiences a ghost.  
Since event models are partial and compositional (ibid.: 25-28), in the sense that 
they only model those aspects of the scene that are causally relevant, what a person 
believes about the objects that are perceived will greatly impact on their place in the 
event model. For example, when entering a dim room, a light switch will be salient to 
anyone who possesses semantic knowledge of how electrically lit rooms are structured, 
but not to someone who has grown up without electricity. This effect can help us explain 
how “special objects,” such as statues, talismans, or images that have been imbued with 
agent-like properties, can be causally relevant for people who “know” their special 
properties. In the presence of such objects, insiders to this cultural knowledge may 
predict and explain subevents in ways that outsiders would not. 
These various forms of prior knowledge (evolved and learned, event-schematic 
and referent-specific) are tightly interwoven in real-time experience. We can illustrate 
this by returning to the ghost-seeing example. Referent-specific knowledge that a house 
is “haunted” can trigger a ghost-seeing event schema, which will guide one’s attention in 
certain ways. The script draws attention to particular perceptions or sensations, which 
might not be salient in another script, and triggers evolved inference systems such as 
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agent detection, which heightens the likelihood of attributing agent-like properties to 
available cues. The inferred presence of an unseen agent will modulate the causal 
framework of the working model so that a slight temperature change, a weird smell, a 
gust of wind, and squeaking floor boards are no longer random (unintended) subevents 
but rather the intentional actions of a ghost.  
 Because event models are generated through an interaction between prior 
knowledge and a wide range of input cues that the subject senses and perceives in their 
environment and within themselves, intentions and causes can be perceived in an event 
rather than simply attributed post hoc. Once they are perceived, they may direct our 
attention in specific ways and determine what else we perceive as relevant in an event. 
Because implicit inferences about causality, intentionality, and meaning can be made as 
the working model is constructed, these inferences not only help determine the overall 
structure of the model in the moment of construction, but also shape post-hoc reflections 
on what happened. Event cognition, thus, offers a complex and nuanced theory of how 
event models (the working model of what is happening right now and, thus, our real-time 
experience) are related to cultural representations and event narratives.   
 Unfortunately, because event models are mental models, we cannot access them 
directly.  If we are willing to take a more pragmatic and probabilistic approach, however, 
we can use research on event cognition, first, to rethink the relationship between original 
experience events and later narratives and, second, when sources are available, to 
distinguish between input cues and appraisals and in some instances specific causal 
attributions in order to reconstruct the relationship between post hoc event narratives and 
the initial working model. We will now consider each of these opportunities separately. 
 
3.2. The relationship between the original experience and later narratives  
Event cognition gives us a fresh perspective on the hard problem of how a narrative 
might relate to an original event.  Although we acknowledge a definite methodological 
challenge here, we think that the notion of an event model helps us to state the problem 
more clearly and to suggest constructive, commonsense ways to deal with it. 
 The problem is how/whether we can make inferences about mental experience 
based on a textual account. Traditionally, this problem has been seen as one of 
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establishing reference between an experience (“what really happened”) and a public 
representation of the experience. Apart from unusual situations where the public 
representation in some sense constitutes the experience (such as automatic writing and 
channeling), event narratives are always post-hoc and, thus, based on an event model (the 
remembered event) generated at the time of narration.10  The historian’s reconstruction 
must therefore proceed in two steps: first, moving from a public event representation (an 
event narrative) to the mental event representation of the narrator at the time of narration 
(a memory); and second, moving from this event model (of the remembered event) to a 
(hypothetical) earlier working model of the initial event, whether concerned with internal 
or external cues. The whole reconstructed sequence from input to event narrative can be 
represented as follows: 
 
CUES à EVM1 (WORK) à EVM2 (MEMORY) à EVNARRATIVE 
 
 Considered as a logical problem, going from narrative to original cues is, of course, 
a formal fallacy (affirming the consequent). As with most scientific problems, however, it 
is not a question of logical inference but of making weighted abductive inferences to the 
best explanation. Considered as such, the first step is relatively easy while the second 
remains hard, because there are numerous pathways to the construction of an event 
model. Thus, a narrated event might originate in a working model of a personally 
experienced event, a situation model derived from something one has heard or read, or a 
hypothetical situation made up on the spot. Since the event cognition literature stipulates 
that the same principles will be at work in all these types of event processing, it does not 
help us determine the difference. However, it does specify a number of detailed 
mechanisms for how narratives are related to mental models. This allows us to infer a 
model from the narrative, which is what makes the first step relatively easy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 When the experiencer produces a public representation directly from the working model – that is, 
narrating an event as it is happening as in the case of “automatic writing” and “channeling” or in response 
to the question “what do you see right now?” – the process can be formalized as:  
CUES à EVM1(WORKM) à EVNARRATIVE1 à EVM2(MEMORY) à EVNARRATIVE2 
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 Modest though this latter fact may be, we argue that it is nevertheless of great 
methodological significance for how we study experience narratives and relate them to 
real-time experience events. The research process will require us to first use our best 
historical-critical judgment to assess the text genre, authorial intent, and reliability of the 
source, but in cases where we feel justified in assuming that the narrative is based on an 
actual working model, we can use event cognition principles to backtrack from public to 
mental representations [see Fig. 3].  
 
[FIG. 3 GOES HERE] 
 
 Many practical problems still remain, but we now have a framework for dealing 
with them more systematically. For example, while it is certainly true that memory fades 
with time and accounts of past events may be altered or even wholly invented, event 
cognition helps us distinguish elements of a narrative that are likely to be inventions or 
later elaborations from those that are more likely to be accurate.  
 Both externally and internally generated events come with a set of event boundaries 
that correspond to the initial segmentation of experience in the working model. These 
event boundaries are potent anchors in long-term memory: information that is located 
close to event boundaries is more richly coded than information far away from the 
boundaries (Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009; Swallow et al., 2011), and are recalled 
with greater precision on the longer term (cf. Radvansky & Zacks, 2014: 133-137). 
Furthermore, the causal integration of event elements is also central to how well it is 
remembered (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000). In contrast, surface information (e.g. 
physical properties of entities) that is poorly integrated fades quickly (Radvansky & 
Zacks, 2014: 137) and is easily fabricated.  
Historians can use these features to assess the trustworthiness of experience 
narratives and gauge what might have been experienced at the time the working model 
was constructed. For example, they can infer that details at event boundaries are more 
likely to be accurate (that is, correspond with the original model) than details far away 
from such shifts. They may also assume that sudden, abrupt events will be particularly 
well remembered and faithfully narrated.  
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The event cognition literature also helps historians to hypothesize about specific 
sorts of distortions that may be of interest. For example, if information comes to light 
after initial event processing that would make certain kinds of surface details more 
relevant than they were during initial encoding, details may be highlighted or elaborated 
when the model is recreated post hoc. A person who learns an astrological 
correspondence system between planets and colors only after having had a particularly 
salient dream (“I was taken to a palace made of precious stones”) may add astrologically 
significant color details during later recounting of the dream (“I think the walls had a 
greenish hue, like emeralds – this place belonged to Venus”). While building on a 
previous event (i.e., preserving basic segmentation), the resulting new event model is, 
however, less likely to have “recovered” an old property detail than to have invented it in 
a process of integrating new schematic knowledge (cf. Radvansky & Zacks, 2014: 138-
139). Such invention would, however, not be evidence of deceit, but rather of a normally 
functioning system of event processing that pays attention to whatever it perceives as 
causally relevant information. 
 
3.3. The Relationship between Experiences and Appraisals 
 Event models also allow us to conceptualize the relationship between experience 
and appraisal in a more nuanced fashion. As already discussed, appraisals, including 
attributions of causes and intentions, are not merely supplied post hoc, but also play a 
generative role in the segmentation of events, the selection of elements to be represented 
in the model, and memory traces for individual elements in the event. Because a causal 
framework is generated through a series of appraisals of a wide range of cues that the 
subject senses and perceives in their environment and within themselves, the cues are 
often represented in event narratives along with the tacit appraisals.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Taves, 2009, 107-109, for examples. Scholars in the humanities usually refer to these claims about 
events as “interpretations”; sociologists analyze how interpretations “frame” events; and social 
psychologists analyze how people “attribute” meaning to events.  Cognitive psychologists in turn use 
various methods to analyze the role of unconscious appraisal processes in arriving at these claims.  Because 
all these levels interact when people make claims about events, we can refer to frames, attributions, and 
appraisals depending on our level of focus. But because the unconscious cognitive processes constrain the 
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Drawing inspiration from Bertram Malle’s analyses of how people explain events 
(Malle 2004; Taves 2009, 100-111), we can use the distinction between cues and 
appraisals to analyze event narratives and, in cases where we have multiple accounts, to 
assess the relationship between the post hoc event narratives and the initial working 
model.  If we have a detailed narrative of an event, we can divide the event into sub-
events by asking “what happened” and “why it happened” from the point of view of the 
narrator as the event narrative unfolds.  In many cases, this allows us to tease apart the 
cues that the subject sensed or perceived (“what happened”), the inferences they drew 
from them (“what it means”), and the causes or reasons they implicitly or explicitly gave 
for them (“why it happened”).   
The subject may view what happened as either intended or unintended.  Intended 
action would involve an agent, while an unintended event would not.  In the former case, 
they will presuppose reasons; in the latter case causes.  Subjects may infer, however, that 
an event that they did not intend was intended by an unseen other, based on real-time 
cues that trigger schemata or post hoc reflection.  In all cases, the linkages between what 
happened and why it happened that are built into the event model will attach 
corresponding agent or non-agent representations of varying degrees of specificity to the 
sensations or perceptions.  Thus, for example, in the context of sleep paralysis, subjects 
often hallucinate the presence of intruders based on bodily and environmental cues, 
which they may upon reflection attribute to sleep paralysis or actual, albeit unverifiable, 
agents.   
If we only have one account and it is narrated long after the event, it may be 
impossible to distinguish cues and appraisals that were built into the event from later 
insertions and reflections on the event.  However, when we have multiple accounts of the 
same event recounted at different points in time, we can compare the versions by dividing 
the event into sub-events (as above) and interweaving the accounts so that we can 
compare the sub-events.  Depicting the analysis in charts allows us to see what sub-
events were added or deleted as the narrative was retold and analyze to what extent the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
way that we make these interpretations, we are using appraisal processes as an umbrella term to refer to the 
multi-level processes of event interpretation (for our definition, see note 5 above). 
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narrator altered the way they described the subevents over time (for an elaboration on this 
method, see Taves in press).   
When the description of “what happened” remains stable across accounts, this 
allows us to identify a plausible early representation of the sensory cues that comprised 
the original event model.  If some portions of the reasons subjects offer to explain the 
cues remain stable over time, this suggests that those reasons may have been closely 
connected to the initial spontaneous appraisal of the event.  Reasons that change over 
time likely represent the subject’s more conscious reflections on the experience and, thus, 
can be analyzed in relation to the context in which the narrative was retold (for an 
example and discussion of a particular case, see Taves and Harper in press). When 
sources are available, this method allows us to reconstruct events as subjects may have 
experienced them initially and trace how their depiction of what happened both in terms 
of cues and appraisals changed over time.  Much like redaction criticism in biblical 
studies, this method can then be used to analyze the way in which individuals or groups 
turn experience events into “identity events,” constituting themselves as a special group 
or person in relation to them. 	  
4 Integrating Experience Events into CSR: Comparative and Experimental 
Implications 
Viewing experiences as events not only allows us to advance solutions to classical 
problems in the study of (religious) experience; it also allows us to integrate disparate 
lines of research in CSR to create an integrated framework for studying both existing and 
emergent phenomena, using a mix of historical, ethnographic, and experimental methods. 
In this section we argue that the event cognition framework help us connect the study of 
experience with existing research on rituals and representations. A common theoretical 
framework of event segmentation, predictive coding, and cognitive resource depletion 
offers a foundation for robust comparisons of different types of event narratives that are 
of interest to scholars of religion, suggesting some common features of such events 
spanning ritual action, natural disasters, and experiences. An event cognition framework 
also allows us to expand and improve on existing lines of experimental research and 
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suggest specific hypotheses that should be tested empirically. We elaborate on the 
comparative and experimental potential in the next two sections. 
 
4.1 Comparing (Religious) Experience and (Ritualized) Action as Events  
The most direct point of integration between experiences as events and classical 
CSR lies with research on ritualized actions (Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Nielbo & Sørensen, 
2011, 2013), which has already drawn on research in event cognition to identify changes 
in action parsing in ritualized as compared to ordinary action sequences.  In the terms 
used here, an action sequence is a scripted goal-directed event comprised of a number of 
sub-(action)-events.  Ritualized events, as depicted in these studies, generally have an 
overall goal, but prescribe a series of sub-events in order to reach the goal that are not 
connected to sub-goals as they are in ordinary action sequences (Boyer, 1994). Building 
on Boyer and Liénard’s (2006) concept of goal demotion, Schjoedt et al. (2013: 45) 
distinguish between causal opaqueness – the lack of evident causal connections between 
sub-events – and goal demotion, which, like all goal-directed action, implies animacy and 
intentional specification.  
Nielbo and Sørensen (2011) offer experimental evidence to confirm Boyer and 
Liénard’s hypothesis that participants segment action events in which there is no obvious 
causal relation between the subparts into smaller units than they do when there is an 
evident causal connection between them.  In commenting on this line of research, both 
Fessler (2006) and Schjoedt et al. (2013) hypothesize a link between these two features 
(causal opacity and goal demotion) and appraisal processes.  Fessler (2006) suggests that 
non-functional sequences of sub-events generate “spurious associations,” while Schjoedt 
et al. (2013, 45) hypothesize that these features deplete cognitive processing resources, 
thus limiting the capacity for action comprehension within the context of the event itself 
and allowing “the post-ritual construction of meaningful action representations.”   
Although not necessarily incompatible, Fessler’s hypothesis would allow for the 
generation of associations as the event unfolds, while the cognitive resource depletion 
hypothesis would minimize intra-event associations (real-time appraisals) and emphasize 
post-event meaning construction.  Segmentation and analysis of cues and appraisals in 
narratives collected at intervals after participation in a ritualized event would allow us to 
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assess and compare (1) segmentation rates when people are observing or participating in 
ritualized events and when they recount them after the fact, and (2) their appraisals in 
immediately and remotely recalled ritualized events.  These comparisons would allow us 
to assess the relative weight of intra-event and post-event appraisals under different 
conditions and, thus, to better understand the unconscious and conscious appraisal 
processes through which meanings and, in some cases, social formations, are generated.  
This research could be combined with research demonstrating how small shifts in 
semantic linkages can trigger new social movements (Sørensen 2007; Taves 2014). 
Recalling our typology of event types (Table 1), we can also make comparisons 
between representations of ritual actions and the other three types of events. Narrative 
accounts of unintended events, both external (e.g., natural disasters) and internal (e.g., 
dreams and other seemingly spontaneous subjective experiences) should provide 
illuminating comparisons with narratives of intended events and, at the same time, allow 
us to examine the conditions under which unintended events are (re)appraised as intended 
events.  Natural disasters, such as earthquakes and forest fires, are events with causes 
(causally connected antecedents and sub-events) but no reasons (i.e., goals) unless they 
are attributed to agents.  Dreams and other seemingly spontaneous subjective experiences 
also have no reasons (i.e., goals) unless they are attributed to agents.  In contrast to 
intended events, which are always presumed to have agents, we can investigate the 
conditions under which people tend to attribute (unseen) agency to otherwise unintended 
events.   
 We hypothesize that we would find similar segmentation rates and processing 
demands in causally opaque event sequences, whether they are intended and unintended, 
and that casually opaque event sequences would increase cognitive load, generate 
“spurious” intra-event associations (i.e., real-time appraisals) that would in turn make the 
event more memorable, and lead to increased reflection in the wake of the event. 
Distinguishing carefully between “what happened” and “why it happened” in narratives 
of events allows us to assess the causal links between sub-events and, thus, to gauge their 
causal opacity.  When we have evidence that allows us to reconstruct a plausible working 
model of causally opaque event narratives, we can distinguish those subevents for which 
subjects were able to offer implicit appraisals and those for which they were not and 
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consider to what extent these implicit appraisals informed subject’s post-hoc assessments 
of the event. Finally, we can examine the circumstances under which the post-hoc 
reflection on experience events is taken up in interaction with others and, in some 
circumstances, viewed as “religious experiences”.  
 
4.2 Experimental Manipulation of Working Models 
A dual-processing view of cognition that separates fast, online inferences made on 
the fly from slow, reflective reasoning (i.e., “System 1” vs. “System 2”; Kahneman, 
2011) has become something of a default position in CSR work focused on explaining the 
epidemiology of religious concepts (e.g. Barrett, 2008; Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; 
Gregory & Barrett, 2009; McCauley, 2011; cf. Asprem, 2015). We hold that event 
cognition is online reasoning – that is, the quick inferences of System 1 take place in the 
construction of working models. This assumption lets us examine the relationship 
between representations, inferential processes, memory, and experience, using the 
framework of event cognition to formulate hypotheses that can be tested by a 
combination of ethnographic and experimental methods. In this final section, we discuss 
three lines of empirical research that can contribute to our understanding of how cultural 
schemata, representations, and evolved processing come together in the real-time 
construction of working models: inner sense cultivation, experimentally simulated 
experiences, and cognitive impairments. 
Inner Sense Cultivation: One surprisingly under-research aspect of religious 
experiences (and, we might add, of CSR in general) is the question of skill. The common 
claim of “mystics” and recipients of “revelations” that their experiences “just happened to 
them” may have obfuscated the role of practice and skill-development in generating such 
experiences. The tendency to focus on “culture” in the abstract rather than on the 
patterned practices (Roepstorff et al. 2010) that produce differences in perception, 
cognition, and experience within societies (e.g. between musicians, cab drivers, chefs, 
and financial analysts in London) likely contributed as well. This hiatus is being filled by 
recent work on “inner sense cultivation” (Luhrmann, Nusbaum, & Thisted, 2010; 
Luhrmann & Morgain, 2012; Luhrmann, 2012, 2013; cf. Noll, 1985), which is a form of 
learning that is presumably at work in a wide range of culturally specific experiential 
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practices, from evangelicals hearing the voice of God (Luhrmann, 2012) to shamans 
visiting other worlds (Noll, 1985). These practices have usually been seen as operating on 
mental imagery in any perceptual modality (e.g. Kosslyn, Thompson, and Ganis 2006), 
such that they increase the vividness of imagery and, more importantly, change the ways 
that mental content is being appraised.  
The event cognition framework can help us improve this work in two different 
ways, one theoretical and the other empirical. On the theoretical side, event cognition 
helps us explain how inner sense cultivation might work by pointing to specific 
mechanisms at the level of event model construction. Technically, we can reframe the 
learning process as modulating predictive models for event processing so that top-down 
expectations of agency and external causation are allowed to explain away internally 
generated bottom-up input, stemming from, e.g., the default mode network (e.g. Agnati et 
al., 2013), the motor system (e.g., the corollary discharge signals thought to generate 
internal speech; Scott, 2013), or from autonomic bodily functions and states (e.g. Seth, 
Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). In other words, we suggest broadening the focus from 
“mental imagery” to a much wider set of internally generated signals, and focusing on 
how training processes guide attention to these subtle cues. By learning to recognize 
specific sensory and bodily signals as cues, these signals can modulate predictions and 
generate a working model that produces an “experience” (recognizing mental content and 
establishing automatic real-time appraisals). In short, the process can allow internal 
sensory data to be perceived as externally caused or related to an external agent.  
On the empirical side, we suggest that event cognition and predictive coding can 
help us develop experimental approaches to inner sense cultivation. Tanya Luhrmann et 
al.’s (2010) use of psychological experiments to uncover individual differences in scores 
on the absorption scale that correlate with the capacity to cultivate mental imagery 
already constitutes a significant advance. Drawing on event cognition, we can expand this 
experimental dimension to the study of concrete psychophysical cuing techniques used in 
the wild. Working together, ethnographers and historians can sample a range of practices 
that use cuing to induce different types of experiences, while experimentalists can extract 
and reconstruct the cuing techniques in the attempt to reproduce a range of experiences 
under different test conditions. Here we suggest there is much to be gained from 
	   23 
consulting recent experimental work on how abnormal interoceptive processing may lead 
to unusual experiences of emotions, body-ownership, and sense of presence. For 
example, Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley (2012: 2) argue that disorders in the sense of 
presence (such as depersonalization disorder) result from a pathological imprecision in 
interoceptive predictive signals – that is, a failure of top-down models to successfully 
explain away the lower-level input. Since both the top-down predictions and the process 
of error monitoring can be manipulated by a range of techniques ranging from 
psychophysics to suggestion, illusions related to presence, agency, emotion, body-
ownership and so forth can all be produced in healthy individuals (cf. van Elk, 
Lenggenhager, Heydrich, & Blanke, 2014). We should also expect them to be exploited 
in cultural practices aimed at producing certain extraordinary experiences, such as out-of-
body experiences, which have a stabilizing effect on some religious representations (cf. 
Metzinger, 2009). These building blocks should be tested in a laboratory setting and 
related to the broader literature on normal and abnormal interoceptive processing. 
Simulated Experiences: The above reflections bring us to the question of what 
event cognition offers to studies that simulate experiences in the lab.  We suggest that the 
framework can be used to identify variables that should make a difference in the 
construction of the working model (i.e., the experience). We can illustrate this in relation 
to Andersen et al.’s (2014) innovative simulation of “sensed presence” under conditions 
of suggestion and sensory deprivation. While the experimental paradigm outlined in this 
study bears great promise, we think it pays insufficient attention to the multiple ways that 
culture and memory – through event schemata and referent-specific knowledge – play 
into the construction of working models. An analysis of the experimental setup in terms 
of event cognition can therefore help us refine the design and test more specific 
hypotheses about the experiential technologies we find in the wild. 
 Assuming a predictive coding framework, Andersen et al. acknowledged three 
principal ways in which experimentalists can modulate a subject’s experiences: by 
targeting 1) top-down predictions, 2) bottom-up sensory input, or 3) the error monitoring 
process. In this study, the authors focused on top-down predictions through suggestion, 
demonstrating how the results of Persinger’s famous “God helmet” experiments 
(Persinger, 2002; cf. Granqvist et al., 2005) could be reproduced without any transcranial 
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electromagnetic stimulation. The study used three different participant groups – 
spiritualists, new agers, and non-practitioners – chosen on the assumption that these 
groups would bring with them different prior expectations.   
We can identify four variables in this setup that contribute to the construction of 
the working model (i.e., the experience), and hence ought to be isolated for the sake of 
hypothesis testing: 1) the subject’s repertoire of event schemata (“cultural background”); 
2) subject’s referent-specific knowledge of stimulus (suggestion/prior knowledge related 
to helmet); 3) stimulus (the helmet); and 4) environment (removal of visual 
stimuli/sensory deprivation).  Interpreted in this way, their paradigm allows us to 
investigate how internal(ized) event schemata and referent-specific knowledge, which 
attributes causally relevant properties to objects, can modulate the construction of 
working models, presumably by explaining away the “neural noise” that becomes salient 
under conditions of sensory deprivation (on this cf. Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009).12  
Analyzing the setup this way points to a number of different mechanisms that 
might individually account for the reported experiences. For example, we should 
distinguish experimentally between the possible effect of pre-existing event schemata (1) 
and referent-specific knowledge (2). This is particularly important given the results of the 
study: while all three groups reported unusual experiences, only the spiritualists – who 
typically have event schemata for experiences that might be labeled “sensed presence” – 
significantly reported this type of experience. This suggests that event schemata were 
more crucial than suggestion for shaping the reported appraisals. Future experiments 
should tease apart the different effects: Would the spiritualists and new agers have 
performed the way they did even without suggestion (i.e., under conditions of sensory 
deprivation alone)? What if the referent-specific knowledge attached to the stimulus was 
not merely introduced as a suggestion in the experiment, but itself a part of the subject’s 
prior background knowledge? What if, for example, some new agers were using 
“meditation helmets” in their practice that in turn triggered related schemata (“bliss”, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In other words, we are not convinced that the only effect of sensory deprivation is to inhibit error 
monitoring. It also has a “positive” effect, of bringing attention to bottom-up input from the default mode 
network that is drowned out during wakeful interaction with the external world. Thus there is a shift in the 
source of upstream input that the hierarchical model tries to predict.  
	   25 
“cosmic consciousness”), while spiritualists (say) made no use of this particular object? 
What would happen, then, if experimenters deliberately used culturally embedded 
objects, like crystals, Ouija boards, icons, or magical sigils, and pooled subjects who do 
and do not have referent-specific expectations attached to these material signs? The event 
cognition framework assumes that these forms of semantic memory for objects do matter, 
and that testing their relative influence on the production of quite specific experiential 
working models could make a serious contribution to understanding the cultural 
technologies for inducing experiences we find in the wild.  
 Cognitive Impairments: Finally, the event cognition literature enables us to 
pinpoint exactly how cultural schemata influence experiences, allowing us to formulate 
specific hypotheses about semantic knowledge, memory, and the interaction between 
schemata and cues. Since the event cognition literature specifies the kinds of memory 
systems that need to be at work in the processing of events (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014: 
124-131; cf. Ranganath & Titchey, 2012: 720), we can formulate empirical hypotheses 
about the effects of different kinds of memory impairment on the capacity for having and 
reporting certain kinds of experiences. This line of research would contribute to work on 
how relevant cognitive impairments make religion baffling (e.g. Norenzayan, Gervais & 
Trzeniewski, 2012) by expanding from the realm of representations to the realm of 
experiences and memory impairment. For example, we would predict that subjects with 
impaired long-term event model access (i.e., episodic memory impairments), such as 
classic amnesiacs, and possibly some patients suffering from (early) dementia and 
Korsakoff’s syndrome, will still have access to relevant event schemata (e.g., in the shape 
of semantic memories and non-declarative, procedural memories for specific types of 
events) that would enable them to generate new working models that predict religious 
content.13 By contrast, people suffering from traumas that correlate more strongly with 
impairments of semantic memory, such as semantic dementia, herpes encephalitis, 
temporal lobe epilepsy and Alzheimer’s disease (following Ranganath & Ritchey’s 
[2012] discussion of two separate cortical networks for memory function), should be 
unlikely to produce such event models as they would lack access to the (semantic) event-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Note, however, that some of these patient groups have semantic as well as episodic memory impairments. 
Empirical studies on these lines would have to refine the research questions beyond what we can do at 
present, and carefully select and screen its test groups. 
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schematic resources for making the necessary predictions. This population may certainly 
report experiences that seem bizarre (cf. Sacks, 2012), but they are unlikely to conform to 
any conceptual schema that would deem them religious. These two hypotheses should be 
sharpened and tested empirically by looking at experience narratives in people with 
different types of memory impairment, or by pooling them in the sort of experimental set-
up discussed above.  
A third problem, the effect of working memory impairments, should also be 
explored by this prospective research program. These impairments should affect the 
ability to construct working models in general, but it is less clear what alteration if any 
we should expect in terms of experiences deemed religious. One plausible hypothesis, 
consistent with our previous discussion of opacity, cognitive load, and real-time 
appraisal, is that working memory impairment (for example, in patients with ADHD) 
leads to the construction of poorly integrated event models, which should lead to 
increased prediction error, higher segmentation rates, and thus more frequent explanatory 
gaps between subevents. On this hypothesis, a deficit in working memory might make a 
person more susceptible to filling the explanatory gaps in everyday events with culturally 
available appraisals, in a fashion analogous to the effect of cognitive resource depletion 
studied in the context of particularly demanding rituals (Schjoedt et al. 2013). Impaired 
working memory might make for particularly good believers, who are more likely to rely 
on cultural content to explain their personal experiences.  
 
5. Conclusion   
For humanists and even social scientists to appreciate the value of the cognitive science 
of religion, we have to do more than reduce; we also have to reconstruct. As cognitively 
informed historians our goal is to take things apart in order to show how they have been 
put together, that is, ultimately to show that they are constructed from and supported by 
lower level processes.  CSR to date has worked hard to identify the lower level processes, 
but is only beginning to explore how things have been put together.  In presupposing and 
promoting a building block approach, we are embracing both.   
Here we have argued that treating experiences as events allows us to integrate 
experience into an event cognition framework alongside representations and actions.  
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Doing so, we have argued, offers a framework for addressing old problems in the study 
of experience and integrating different strands of CSR research.  Just as important, 
however, event cognition provides a basis for introducing a more rigorous, detailed 
analysis of first person narratives, including narratives of unusual experiences (dreams, 
visions, and so forth) into CSR.  In doing so, we are creating a bridge from experimental 
work in CSR to narratives – the primary data of historians and ethnographers. Without 
these links, which we can then extend into micro-social interactions, small group 
processes, and the emergence of networks and other more complex social formations, we 
cannot effectively do the work of analyzing how complex formations have emerged from 
more basic processes. 
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Table 1: Event types 
 
 
EXTERNAL 
 
 
INTERNAL 
 
 
 
INTENDED 
 
Public actions 
(agents doing things for 
reasons) 
 
Private actions 
(reasoning, imagining) 
 
 
UNINTENDED 
 
Public events 
(e.g., natural 
phenomena, accidents) 
 
Private events 
(e.g., dreaming, hearing 
voices, seeing things 
that aren’t there) 
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Table 2: Three Positions on Accessing Experiences and Appraisals 
 Theory 
Presupposes 
Access to 
experience  
Appraisals Source of 
appraisals 
Research 
investigates 
 
Perennialist 
Universal core 
experience, 
encoded in 
multiple 
narratives 
YES Post hoc Core experience 
filtered through 
culture 
Core experience 
behind divergent 
appraisals 
 
 
Constructivist 
Multiple 
experience 
narratives 
NO All the way 
down 
Culture Appraisals in 
cultural context  
 
Event cognition 
Multiple event 
models and 
experience 
narratives 
When data 
permits, can 
reconstruct 
working model 
Real-time and 
post hoc 
Input (cues) 
combined with 
prior knowledge  
Reconstructed 
real-time as well 
as post-hoc 
appraisals 
 
 
